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S U M M A R Y
In our daily life, we are often confronted with problems of matching, voting and cooper-
ation: students have to be matched to schools, and organ transplants need to be matched
to patients; presidents are elected, and laws are voted on; and at work projects are under-
taken in groups. This thesis covers different topics in matching and voting theory, as well
as cooperative game theory. The first chapter discusses two-sided matching problems
in which workers’ employment experience shapes firms’ preferences. Assuming that
experience assigns to each worker a set of firms he has been employed by, we first
show that there are experience configurations for which no stable matching exists. We
then present a sufficient condition guaranteeing existence of stable matchings for any
configuration. The condition stipulates the idea that firms are size-sensitive with respect
to the experience of each worker and it allows us characterize the set of stable matchings.
We also provide an example showing that experience size-sensitivity does not assure the
existence of a firm optimal stable matching. We contribute with the third chapter to the
branch of axiomatic characterization within the field of matching theory. We assume
that a resolving rule guides the selection of blocking pairs and show that two axioms
(independence and top optimality) transform such a rule into a gender consistent one.
Stable matchings can be reached when starting from an arbitrary individually rational
matching and iteratively satisfying the pair selected by a gender consistent resolving rule.
The third chapter focuses on voting theory. We consider voting correspondences that
are, besides Condorcet Consistent, immune against the two strong no show paradoxes.
That is, it cannot happen that if an additional voter ranks a winning alternative on
top then that alternative becomes losing, and that if an additional voter ranks a losing
alternative at bottom then that alternative becomes winning. We identify the maximal
voting correspondence that satisfies Condorcet Consistency and is immune against the
two strong no show paradoxes. In particular, voting functions (single-valued voting
correspondences) that are Condorcet Consistent and immune against the two paradoxes
must select from this maximal correspondence, and we demonstrate several ways in
which this can or cannot be done. We also consider a weaker version of Condorcet
Consistency.
The last two chapters discuss topics of cooperation. In the fourth chapter, we introduce
a new concept of farsightedness and base a new solution concept for abstract games on
it. An abstract game consists of a set of states and specifies what coalitions are allowed
to replace one state by another one. Agents are called farsighted if they compare the
status quo to the long-term outcome following their deviation rather than to the status
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they actually deviate to. What the literature has ignored so far is that if a coalition
does not move out of the status quo, they might still expect another coalition to do so.
Specifically, above definition of farsightedness implies that agents ignore this possibility
in their reasoning. So, in fact, agents are not fully farsighted. Expectation functions
assign to each state a (potentially) different state and a coalition that moves from the
former to the latter, thereby creating paths between states. This endows agents with an
expectation about what any potential deviation entails—namely the path of the prescribed
further moves. We extend these functions by capturing coalitions’ expectations about
the consequences of not moving out of a state. We impose three stability and optimality
axioms on extended expectation functions that reflect full farsightedness and rationality.
We then show that an extended expectation function satisfies our axioms if and only if it
can be associated with a non-cooperative equilibrium of the abstract game. We finally
apply our solution to games in characteristic function form and matching problems.
The fifth chapter analyzes individuals’ behavior if agents have to repeatedly cooperate
with others. Although cooperative game theory normally abstracts away of any strategic
interaction between players, we argue that in a repeated set up players would act strate-
gically if they could. We intend to incorporate and predict such (strategic) behavior by
modeling non-cooperative games based on a dynamic game with transferable utility and
point-wise solution concepts for them. We model the strategic interaction between agents
by allowing them to transfer some worth among periods, and, hence, indirectly affect
their payoffs and the payoffs of the other players. We discuss different transfer systems,
specifying what worth agents can transfer and identify Nash equilibria in the resulting
non-cooperative games. Furthermore, we characterize the Nash equilibria and discuss
uniqueness. We also consider particular classes of TU-games, such as market games
and voting games and introduce transfer systems that seem to be suited best for these
games: in market games, agents can transfer their initial endowment among periods, and
in the context of voting games, we allow agents to shift their voting weights over time.
Based on this idea we derive non-cooperative games and further discuss existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibria.
